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(3) Table of Authorities
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(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
As outlined already in the docketing statement:
(c)(2) The statutory provision that confers jurisdiction on the appellate court is 78A-4-103(h).
(c)(3) The following dates relevant to a determination of the timeliness of the notice of appeal:
(c)(3)(A) The date of entry of the final order is May 8th 2008. See Exhibit A.
(c)(3)(B) The date the notice of appeal was filed was June 4th 2008. See Exhibit B.
(c)(3)(C) A motion for a new trial pursuant to rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was filed and
served on May 22nd 2008.
The review of the order entered on May 8th 2006 is explicitly given by:
2007 UT App 95, Case #20070006, Filed March 15th 2007, which held:
Here, the trial court's order did not resolve the
controversy between the parties. Although the order addressed
several issues, it expressly reserved the primary issue, custody
of the children, for trial. As a result, it is not a final
appealable order. See id
In sum, the trial court's order is not a final appealable
order. As a result, this court lacks jurisdiction over this
appeal and must dismiss it. See Bradbury, 2000 UT 50 at 118.
Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed without prejudice to
the filing of a timely notice of appeal after the entry of a
final order.
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(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard
of appellate review with supporting authority; and
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or
As stated in Petitioner's "Brief for February 28th Hearing" filed with the Court on
February 17th 2006 and heard on February 28th 2006.
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations:

UCA 78-3 la-107 states:
(1) An agreement contained in a record to submit to arbitration any
existing or subsequent controversy arising between the parties to the
agreement is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable except upon a ground
that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract.
(2) The court shall decide whether an agreement to arbitrate exists or a
controversy is subject to an agreement to arbitrate.
(3) An arbitrator shall decide whether a condition precedent to
arbitrability has been fulfilled and whether a contract containing a valid
agreement to arbitrate is enforceable.
(7) A statement of the case.
1) On November 10, 2005 the parties participated in a settlement conference. Present at
that meeting were the parties, their attorneys, the Guardian ad Litem, and the custody
evaluators, Kim Peterson and Natalie Malovich. See R. 3790.
2) The parties recorded into a taper recorder in the commissioners office a settlement
agreement comprising a full resolution of all issues which was lost for reasons unknown.
3) The Court held a seven (7) hour evidentiary hearing on February 28, 2006 resulting in
the entry of an order that all aspects of the litigation between the parties were settled on
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by the agreement, and making specific findings of what there was no dispute of, what
was disputed and decided by the court, and what the court could not determine the facts
of. See R. 3787.
4) The court also ordered that because of the litigation between the parties, it was not in
the best interests of the children to adopt the agreement of the parties with respect to
custody, but to determine that independently.
5) The court of appeals would not allow a direct appeal of this order because a final order
of custody was not entered.
6) Petitioner and appellant is not appealing any aspect of subsequent custody
determination, just any enforcement of the agreement.
(8) Summary of arguments.
8.1 The agreement is not enforceable as a matter of law. Because the court found that the
agreement of the parties was against public policy, in that arbitration to decide custody
disputes is not enforceable in Utah, the entire agreement must be discarded as there was
no severability clause.
8.2 The agreement was not enforceable, as the findings of fact of the court clearly
indicate that the court could NOT determine all aspects of the lost agreement as a matter
of law the agreement should not have been enforced.
(9) Argument
9.1 The agreement is not enforceable.
The court specifically found at R. 3792 that:
6

F. Arbitration: All "new" legal and equitable claims (involving only
the parties) would be submitted to binding arbitration. The parties
designated former judge David Roth as the preferred arbitrator. The losing
party in arbitration will bear the other party's full costs and fees associated
with the arbitration.
Again at R. 3795 the court found with regard to arbitration:
1fl9 The Court finds it is more likely than not that the parties agreed
to refer to arbitration all subsequently-arising disputes that did not involve
the children. However, based on the evidence presented, the Court cannot
find clear agreement regarding how parenting and other child-rearing
disputes will be handled if the parties wish to further challenge the Special
Master's determinations on those issues. Presumably, those matters would
proceed to the Court for judicial resolution. Given the litigiousness of these
parties it is highly likely that they would take every opportunity to continue
bringing to Court any issues remotely related to the children. As such, the
Court finds that one of the ostensible goals of this settlement agreemnent—
n-iinimizing future opportunities for conflict on issues involving the
children—is not likely to be achieved.
While as an alternative argument I have argued that the court could not determine
the exact agreement, thus must not enforce it, assuming that the arbitration was agreed to
it is not a legal agreement. Where an agreement is in existence, it is the responsibility of
the arbitrator not the court to determine if it is enforceable. However the court has
already determined it is not possible for the court to grant this power to an arbitrator. See
R. 3790 1f8 which held:
1f8 "Children of divorcing parents are, in a very practical sense,
wards of the court which is charged to regard their best interests. Before
approving an agreement regarding child custody or support, the court
should satisfy itself that the provisions for the care and maintenance of the
children are adequate and sufficient." 24A Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and
Separation § 946 (citing Bell v. Bell, 572 So. 2d 841 (Miss. 1990)).
Continued action in the Trial Court has already, and would continue to violate the
Uniform Arbitration act by making decisions which should be made by the Arbitrator, as
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stated in Petitioner's "Response and Agreement with Motion to enforce Settlement
Agreement" filed with the Court on Januaiy 26th 2006 and heard on February 28th 2006,
UCA 78-3 la-107 states:
(1) An agreement contained in a record to submit to arbitration any
existing or subsequent controversy arising between the parties to the
agreement is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable except upon a ground
that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract.
(2) The court shall decide whether an agreement to arbitrate exists or a
controversy is subject to an agreement to arbitrate.
(3) An arbitrator shall decide whether a condition precedent to
arbitrability has been fulfilled and whether a contract containing a valid
agreement to arbitrate is enforceable.
Thus the entire agreement is not enforceable.
9.2 Could not determine all aspects.
The order itself states that the court COULD NOT determine all aspects of the
agreement. See R. 3795 at Tf 19:
^However, based on the evidence presented, the Court cannot find clear agreement
regarding how parenting and other child-rearing disputes will be handled if the parties
wish to further challenge the Special Master's determinations on those issues.
This was only one of many non-agreements outlined by the court in it's own order.
The law is clear, where an agreement is lost, as in this case, it is only enforceable when
the court can establish all aspects of the lost agreement and that it existed. In Banks v.
Mitsubishi Motors Credit (5th Cir 12/09/2005) Attached as Exhibit D The 5th Circuit
Appeals Court enforced an agreement to arbitrate any dispute and held that it is not
required that a party produce the writing if there is (1) proof that the writing actually
existed at one time plus (2) proof of what was in the writing. This case is directly
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applicable to the situation at hand as all agree that a document(tape) with an agreement to
arbitrate existed, and was recorded
Judge Lindberg further ruled that an agreement was present on December 8th
2005, despite the testimony of respondent that u We don't agree" Exhibit C, Trial
Transcript Page 139 line 15. Furthermore if indeed the parties agreed on November 10th
to resolve all further disagreements by Binding Arbitration as the Court has ruled,
enforcement of a subsequent alleged agreement on December 8th 2005 is beyond the
jurisdiction of the court and lies with the Binding Arbitrator. The absurdity of this ruling
in circular reference is clear.
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
10.1 For an order that the agreement between the parties is not enforceable as against
public policy.
10.2 For an order that the agreement between the parties is not enforceable as the specific
findings of fact made by the court show that no complete agreement was reached or
reproduced by the court.
(11) An addendum to the brief contains the following:
All constitutional provisions were produced verbatim in the brief.
All cases cited are published.
The findings of fact and conclusions of law are attached as Exhibit A.
Dated this l_Lday of January, 2009
Loger Bryner
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT %.
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

ROGER BRYNER,

SAL]
°«P«ty Clerk

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND JUDGMENT ON
CROSS-MOTIONS TO ENFORCE
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

Petitioner,
vs.
SVETLANA BRYNER,
Respondent.

Case No. 044904183
Judge Denise Posse Lindberg

If 1
This case involves a highly contentious divorce.1 At issue before the Court is the
question whether an enforceable settlement agreement was reached by the parties on or about
November 10lh, 2005. On that date the parties met in a settlement conference with the
Commissioner. After negotiations, the parties attempted to place the terms of the agreement on
the record before the Commissioner. Although a Minute Entry of that meeting with the
Commissioner exists, no official recording of that meeting and the terms of the purported
agreement has been found. Soon thereafter, the parties began to dispute the specific terms of the
agreement. The parties continued meeting to resolve their differences and execute the
agreement. Although the parties achieved some success in narrowing their differences, the
parties ultimately declined to sign the Stipulation. As a result of this impasse, on December 21,
2005, Respondent filed a Verified Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement. Petitioner concurs
that an agreement was reached by the parties and should be enforced. However, he puts forward
a different version of the purported agreement. Essentially then, the Court is faced with crossmotions to enforce conflicting versions of a purported agreement.2
Tf2
The Court held a seven (7) hour evidentiary hearing on February 28, 2006. Petitioner,
Roger Bryner, appeared pro se. Respondent, Svetlana Bryner, was present and represented by

l

On or about July 16, 2004, Petitioner filed a Petition for Divorce alleging that the parties
had entered an unsolemnized marriage of approximately 10 years' duration (June 1994-June
2004), during which time the parties held themselves out as husband and wife, Respondent took
Petitioner's surname as her own, and two children were born.
2

This simplified summary deliberately omits reference to the numerous motions and other
filings spawned by this attempt at settlement. Although not specifically addressed here, all
filings were reviewed by the Court in advance of the hearing held February 28, 2006.
-1-
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her counsel, Emily Broadhead Smoak. Guardian ad Litem, Kim Luhn, also appeared and
addressed the Court. After hearing the testimony and receiving exhibits, the Court entered
preliminary findings of fact and conclusions of law. Normally, the Court would rely on one of
the parties to prepare an Order reflecting and supporting the Court's Findings, Conclusions, and
Judgment. However, given the litigation history between these parties, the Court determined that
it would prepare its own Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment. By doing so, the
Court hoped to eliminate one more opportunity for disagreement between the parties.
TJ3
While in the process of memorializing its Findings, Conclusions and Judgment in this
case, the Court was asked by Judge Dever if it would accept the transfer of another case
(involving an ex parte civil stalking injunction) which Petitioner had initiated against
Respondent the day before the February 28th hearing.3 The Court agreed. Following an
evidentiary hearing held on April 11th on the new civil stalking case, the Court entered an
Amended Order dated April 20, 2006 (the "April 20th Order"), hi connection with the April 20th
Order, the Court entered several additional rulings, one of which is pertinent here. In that ruling
the Court acknowledged that following the February 28th hearing it had entered preliminary
findings that the parties had reached an enforceable agreement on most issues raised in the
divorce case. Notably, however, at no time during the February 28th hearing did Petitioner or
Respondent proffer any evidence concerning the welfare of the children, or how it would be
affected by enforcement of the settlement agreement. Rather, the parties assumed that the
compromise settlement would benefit the children.4
Tf4
The Court is now questioning whether enforcing all the terms of the settlement agreement
is in the best interests of the children. The Court's reconsideration stems from the fact that the

3

On February 27, 2006, Petitioner sought, and received, an ex parte stalking injunction
against Respondent. See Third District Court Case No. 060903365. That case had been assigned
to Judge Dever.
At no time during the February 28th hearing did Petitioner inform the Court of this
development. Respondent only became aware of it after she was served with the ex parte Order
in early March. As a result of that Order, Respondent was precluded from attending the
children's school and participating in various school-based activities.
Pursuant to statute, Respondent's counsel requested an expedited evidentiary hearing,
which was held by this Court on April 11, 2006. Following that hearing the Court determined
that the petition for a civil stalking injunction should be dismissed with prejudice, and ordered
that the related ex parte civil stalking injunction be lifted. See id., Amended Order, dated April
2006.
4

The closest anyone came to that issue was the Guardian ad Litem, who expressed
concern about proceeding without the input of the custody evaluators. Those remarks by the
Guardian came at the end of a long day, and after the close of evidence. Unfortunately, the Court
did not "pick up" on those remarks until subsequent events highlighted the issue for the Court.

-2-
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litigiousness of the parties continues unabated, and they appear wholly incapable of resolving
even the simplest issues in good faith and on their own (i.e., without involving judicial or law
enforcement resources). This state of affairs seriously calls into question the ability of these
individuals to effectively co-parent their children, as contemplated by the agreement.
T|5
Because of this concern, the Court asked the parties and the Guardian ad litem to file
supplemental memoranda on the advisability of enforcing the settlement agreement.5 So that the
parties could provide their input, the Court deferred entering its final Findings, Conclusions, and
Judgment until after the supplemental memoranda had been received and reviewed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1f6
Settlements are favored in the law, and should be encouraged because of benefits
accruing to the parties and the judicial system. In re Adoption of EH v. R.C, 103 P.3d 177, 180
(Utah Ct. App. 2004) (citing Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust v. Travelstead, 592 P.2d 605, 607
(Utah 1979)). A trial court has the "power to summarily enforce on motion a settlement
agreement entered into by the litigants while the litigation is pending before it." Id. The
determination of whether to enforce a settlement agreement is governed by basic contract
principles. Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 942 (Utah 1987). hi determining whether the parties
created an enforceable contract, a court should consider all preliminary negotiations, offers and
counteroffers, and interpret the various expressions of the parties. Nunley v. Westates Casing
Serv 's, Inc., 989 P.2d 1077, 12080 (Utah 1999). Moreover, a party cannot rely on the fact that a
settlement agreement has not been signed-a signature is not a requirement to enforcement.
Goodmandsen v. Liberty Vending Sys., 866 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Murray v. State,
737 P.2d 1000, 1001 (Utah 1987).
\J
However, in a divorce context, the Court sits as a court of equity, and is not bound by the
stipulation of the parties. See Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472 (Utah 1975)("It is an established rule
that a stipulation pertaining to matters of divorce, custody and property rights therein, though
advisory upon the court . . . is not necessarily binding on the c o u r t . . . . It is only a
recommendation to be adhered to if the court believes it to be fair and reasonable"); see also
Landv. Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980). See generally 24A Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and
Separation § 938 :
It is the duty of the court to enter orders affecting divorced parties' children that it

'The Court pointedly informed the parties that their supplemental memoranda should not
exceed 5 pages, and should provide a legal analysis of the issue. Although all the memoranda
submitted generally conform to the Court's page-limit requirements, both Petitioner and
Respondent have added attachments. Respondent attaches one Utah case in support of its legal
analysis. Petitioner, on the other hand, has added voluminous attachments of, at best, tangential
relevance. Since the Court specifically indicated a 5-page limit, that is all the Court has
reviewed. The Court also notes that Petitioner's supplemental memoranda is limited to
discussing the "parenting plan."
-3-

believes to be in the best interest of the children, and it is a responsibility that
cannot be delegated or abrogated by agreement of the parties. Contracts as to
custody are not controlling upon the court, although contracts between the spouses
as to the custody of the children will generally be recognized unless the welfare of
the children requires a different disposition.
If 8
"Children of divorcing parents are, in a very practical sense, wards of the court which is
charged to regard their best interests. Before approving an agreement regarding child custody or
support, the court should satisfy itself that the provisions for the care and maintenance of the
children are adequate and sufficient." 24A Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 946 (citing Bell
v. Bell, 572 So. 2d 841 (Miss. 1990)).
Tf9
"When the parties submit a settlement agreement to the court in a dissolution proceeding,
the court can reject some of the terms, and make an independent ruling on those issues and
incorporate the independent ruling and the remainder of the separation agreement into the
decree " 24A Am. Jur. 2d §1124 (citing Welly v. Welly, 55 Ohio App. 3d 111, 562N.E.2d 914
(6th Dist. Williams County 1988)). See also Guthrie v. Guthrie, 277 Ga. 700, 594 S.E.2d 356
(2004) ("When a trial court is presented with a settlement agreement in a divorce proceeding, the
divorce court may exercise its discretion in deciding whether to make any or part of the
settlement agreement between the parties a part of the final decree.") (emphasis added).
1[10
Having received the parties' supplemental memoranda, reviewed the applicable law, and
considered the evidence and testimony presented at the February 28, 2006 hearing, the Court now
enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
T(ll
On November 10, 2005 the parties participated in a settlement conference. Present at that
meeting were the parties, their attorneys, the Guardian ad Litem, and the custody evaluators, Kim
Peterson and Natalie Malovich.6
Tfl2
The Court's review of the parties' competing submissions, each of which purport to
represent the "true" agreement of the parties, makes clear that during the November 10th meeting

6

Based on the testimony received on February 28th, it appears that the custody evaluators
participated in the settlement conference, but did not go into the Commissioner's chambers when
the parties attempted to put their agreement on the record. Dr. Malovich testified that her purpose
in being present at the settlement conference was "to comment, if asked, about how certain
proposals would impact the children." However, during the February 28th hearing Dr. Malovich
was not asked about, and did not comment, on those issues. Nor, for that matter, did Mr.
Peterson.
-4-

the parties reached agreement on a significant number of issues, including the following:'
A.

Final agreement: The stipulation would constitute a final settlement of all issues
then-outstanding between the parties.

B.

Custody: The parties would share legal and physical custody of the children.

C.

Parenting Plan:

D.

1.

Dr. Matt Davies would serve as Special Master to help the parties resolve
any parent-time or other "minor" parenting issues. All disputed issues
involving the children would first be submitted to the Special Master, who
would have decision-making authority.

2.

The parties would act in the children's best interest, would work to
minimize disputes between the parties, and would not involve the children
in those disputes.

3.

Physical custody/parent-time would occur on an alternating, "week-on,
week-off' basis.8

Travel: Each party would have unrestricted international travel with the children
upon 60 days' written notice to the other parent; unrestricted travel within the
U.S.A. on 48 hours' notice. However, if the anticipated out-of-state domestic
travel was to extend for more than one week, the other parent would be entitled to
30 days' notice.9 The children's passports, currently in the custody of one of Mr.
Bryner's ex-counsel (Russell Minas), would be transferred to, and held by, the

7

Where the language or substantive meaning of the competing submissions is essentially
identical, the Court's Findings will not restate those provisions in detail, but merely summarize
their import. There are a number of areas in Petitioner's submittal that, at first blush, appear
different because of underlining or crossed-out items. However, in most cases the apparent
differences are not substantive.
8

The parties' specified how the alternating weeks would work, including arrangements for
picking-up the children, holidays/vacation-time, and summer-time schedule.
9

On its face, the domestic {i.e., U.S.A.) travel provision does not appear to require that the
required notice be provided in writing, in contrast to the international travel provision which so
specifies. Nevertheless, given the amount of specific travel-related infomiation which the parties
subsequently agreed would have to be provided by the traveling parent to the non-traveling
parent, it appears that this omission may have been an oversight rather than an intended
distinction in how domestic vs. international travel would be treated.
-5-

Special Master. The Special Master would make the passports available to the
traveling parent within one week of receiving notice of intent to travel
internationally. The traveling parent would return the passport to the Special
Master within one week of completing the international travel.10 The traveling
parent would be required to arrange for telephonic communication between the
children and the non-traveling party.
E.

Child support and medical expenses: The parties agreed that neither would pay
child support to the other, but that each would pay 50% of all medical and dental
insurance premiums, medical, dental, optical, orthodontic and mental health
expenses incurred on behalf of the children.

F.

Arbitration: All "new" legal and equitable claims (involving only the parties)
would be submitted to binding arbitration. The parties designated former judge
David Roth as the preferred arbitrator. The losing party in arbitration will bear the
other party's full costs and fees associated with the arbitration.

G.

Communications/Emergencies: On non-urgent maters, the parties would
communicate via "civil" email, notebooks, or through a third-party provider. On
urgent matters, the parties would be free to communicate directly.

H.

Appointment of Custody/Parent time evaluators: hi the event a petition to
modify a final order is filed raising custody or parent time issues, the current
custody evaluators (Mr. Peterson and Dr. Malovich) would again be appointed as
evaluators if requested by either party.

I.

Tax exemptions: Each party would be able to claim one child each year. Ms.
Bryner would arrange to file promptly an amended tax return for 2004 (year
during which she apparently claimed both children), and Mr. Bryner would pay

°During the February 28th hearing it became apparent that even these apparently agreedupon travel related provisions could form the basis of further "game-playing" by the parties m
order to frustrate the other. For example, Petitioner hinted at a scenario where if one parent gave
the required notice of intent to travel internationally, the other parent could immediately give
notice of his/her intent to also travel internationally. The parties would then raise competing
claims on the children's passports, ostensibly so each could make the necessary travel
arrangements. Another example of how the parties could frustrate the other became evident
when Petitioner chose to delete what would normally be a non-controversial, indeed pro forma,
provision requiring the non-traveling parent to take all necessary steps to facilitate the children's
travel with the other parent.
10r
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the fees associated with the preparation of the amended return.11
J.

Attorney's fees: The parties would bear their own attorney's fees.

TJ13
A draft written stipulation was prepared, but areas of disagreement soon emerged. The
parties, their attorneys, the Guardian ad Litem, and both custody evaluators again met on or about
December 8, 2005 in order to resolve the remaining disagreements. After further discussion it
was determined that the Guardian ad Litem would take a draft stipulation originally prepared by
Jared Coleman, and revise it to incorporate the parties' further agreement.
^|14
Petitioner has argued that in determining the terms of the settlement agreement, the Court
can only look to the negotiations that occurred on November 10, 2005. Petitioner undercut his
own argument, however, when, during the February 28th hearing, he admitted that some of the
terms found his version of the November 10th agreement were actually negotiated during the
discussions of December 8th. For example, both Petitioner's and Respondent's versions of the
agreement contain a provision that in essence directs that in the event of one parent's demise
prior to the children reaching age of majority, the other parent will ensure that the children
nevertheless maintained meaningful visitation with the family of the deceased parent.
Respondent's Ex. A, Final Stipulation and Settlement Agreement f 8, at 3. That item is one of
several that was not discussed on November 10th, but rather was added on December 8th. The
Court expressly rejects Petitioner's argument that only the November 10th agreement is at issue.
The Court finds that the discussions of December 8th refined and modified further the substance
of the agreement reached on November 10th. Accordingly, it is proper to consider those items as
well. Furthermore, based on the testimony received on February 28th, the Court finds that on
December 8th the parties further clarified the following previously negotiated issues, thereby
incorporating them into their agreement:12
A.

Holiday/vacation time: The parties agreed that whenever "Monday is a school
holiday, the parent with the children will continue to exercise parent time through
Monday, and will take the children to school on Tuesday morning." Respondent's
Ex. A, Final Stipulation and Settlement Agreement ^|5, at 2. Additionally,
"spring break" was added to the list of holiday/vacation periods which would
alternate between the parents, id. at ^f6, at 3, and the Special Master was given

1

Petitioner's version of the parties' agreement deletes a provision making him
responsible for any additional taxes and penalties associated with filing the amended tax return.
As noted infra, the Court finds that the agreement was that he would receive the benefit of
having Respondent amend her return, and therefore he should be responsible for all associated
fees and costs, including any taxes or penalties.
,2

Upon direct questioning by the Court during the February 28th hearing, Petitioner
expressly reaffirmed his agreement with each of the items specified in this paragraph (including
all subsections).
-7-

"authority to make minor adjustments to the visitation schedule and/or the parties
may agree to a specific calendar in writing." Id.
B.

Travel: The parties specified that as part of the notice to be given to the nontraveling parent, the traveling parent would provide "destination addresses, places
where the children and traveling parent can be reached, and the name and
telephone number of an available third person who would be knowledgeable of
the children's location." Respondent's Ex. A, Final Stipulation and Settlement
Agreement f 10, at 3. Additionally, the parties authorized the Special Master to
decide details related to how the children would stay in telephonic contact with
the non-traveling parent (Le.., frequency, length and timing of such contact).

C.

Schooling: The parties clarified that there would be no home-schooling for the
children. Additionally, the parties agreed that tc[a]bsent the express, written
agreement of the parties, [Petitioner] will have the right to choose the children's
school by making no more than one change to a different private school and one
change to a public school. The transition of the children from a junior high school
into the scheduled high school will not be deemed to be a change." Respondent's
Ex. A, Final Stipulation and Settlement Agreement, ^[13(c).13

D.

Child support and medical expenses: The parties agreed that they would
"cooperate to choose a new therapist for the children." Id. at ^[14.

f 15
On December 15, 2005, Petitioner, Respondent, and the Guardian ad Litem met for a final
time, presumably to execute the revised settlement agreement. Petitioner raised additional
objections. Neither party signed the document.
If 16
The parties' disagreement principally centers on three substantive areas. The first
involves the question of which issues, going forward, are to be submitted to binding arbitration.
The second involves the issue of school choice, including length of time the children will attend
private school and allocation of schooling costs. The third involves the status of all past claims
and current litigation between the parties, including litigation brought by the parties' relatives
against either party.
1J17

As noted supra, on November 10th the parties agreed to use a Special Master to deal with
13

During the hearing Petitioner agreed that on December 8th the parties had discussed the
issue of meeting with the administrators or teachers at the Sandy, Utah campus of Challenger
School in order to ask for the children to be readmitted. See Respondent's Ex. A, Final
Stipulation and Settlement Agreement, at 1(13(f). However, he maintained that he never agreed
to that term. Similarly, Petitioner contends that the terms outlined at Tfl3(g) were discussed on
December 8th, but he did not agree. The Court has insufficient evidence before it to enter findings
on those points, but neither issue is of particular importance in the overall agreement.
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disputed parenting issues. The parties also agreed to use binding arbitration in lieu of further
litigation on "new" disputed issues. However, they disagree on whether all subsequently-arising
disputes would be referred to arbitration (including parenting issues, as Respondent contends) or
some issues would be carved out from arbitration and left for resolution by the Court (as
Petitioner argues).
fl8
The version of the agreement put forward by Respondent is, at the very least, ambiguous
on this point. At worst, the structure and language of Respondent's version tends to undercut her
argument that the parties intended binding arbitration to apply to parenting issues. To be sure,
the "parenting plan" section of Respondent's version there is a reference to submitting parenting
issues to arbitration following action by a Special Master. However, that provision appears to be
inconsistent with the notion (also put forward by Respondent), that the Special Master would
have "authority to make decisions on all parent time or minor parenting matters." See Ex. A to
Respondent's Verified Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, ^|3, at 2. Arbitration is
discussed in more detail in a separate section captioned "[w]aiver of all prevous [sic] claims and
causes of action/' There, at |fl6,17, it states that "[a]ny and all legal and equitable claims solely
between the parties . . . must be submitted to binding arbitration." ^[16 (same). Arguably, that
language would exclude submitting to arbitration issues involving the children, who-while
clearly affected by the decisions that are made, are not technically "parties" to this action.14
^19
The Court finds it is more likely than not that the parties agreed to refer to arbitration all
subsequently-arising disputes that did not involve the children. However, based on the evidence
presented, the Court camiot find clear agreement regarding how parenting and other child-rearing
disputes will be handled if the parties wish to further challenge the Special Master's
determinations on those issues. Presumably, those matters would proceed to the Court for
judicial resolution. Given the litigiousness of these parties it is highly likely that they would take
every opportunity to continue bringing to Court any issues remotely related to the children. As
such, the Court finds that one of the ostensible goals of this settlement agreement-minimizing
future opportunities for conflict on issues involving the children-is not likely to be achieved.
Tf20
On the issue of school choice, the parties agreed that Petitioner would select the school(s)
the children would attend. Petitioner argues that the parties agreed he would have unfettered
choice regarding school selection, and how long the children would remain in private schools.
Respondent contends that Petitioner's ability to select the children's schooling was subject to
certain express limitations, such as agreeing to pay the children's private school tuition or, if the
children were in public school, paying money into a college fund for the children.
f21

The Court finds that Respondent expressly traded receiving the statutoiy child support in
14

The Court recognizes that in this case the children are represented by a Guardian ad
Litem who has the right and responsibility to appear on their behalf. However, even in this
context, the Court is not convinced that the Guardian becomes a "party" to the action within the
technical definition of that term.
-9-
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exchange for having Petitioner pay the private school tuition for the children. The Court further
finds that in making this trade, the parties contemplated that those private school costs would be
roughly comparable to what Petitioner would have been required to pay in child support.
Respondent would lose the benefit of that bargain if, as Petitioner contends, he would have
unfettered school choice including the option to have the children attend public school without
contributing an offsetting amount, comparable to private school tuition, into the children's
college fund. The Court finds that Petitioner's choice was limited to either (A) choosing between
private schools through 12th grade, in which case he would be solely responsible for paying the
school tuition and fees, or, (B) opting for a public high school for the children, but then paying
into the children's college fund. The Court further finds that the parties contemplated and agreed
that the children would remain in private schools during their elementary and middle school
years.
Tf22
The parties disagree on whether or not Petitioner agreed to repay Respondent for all the
private school tuition costs Respondent incurred in 2005 and 2006 on behalf of the children.
Petitioner says he never agreed to this; Respondent argues he agreed to this as part of the
December 8th negotiations. Given the Court's finding fat T{21) that Respondent expressly traded
receiving child support in exchange for the tuition, the Court credits Respondent's position on
this matter. The Court finds that the parties agreed that Petitioner would fully, and timely, repay
Respondent for tuition previously paid by her. The Court further finds that Petitioner owes
Respondent $3,500.00 for those costs incurred during 2005-2006, and judgment should enter
against him in that amount. Furthermore, Petitioner should be required to pay those costs within
a reasonable time of the entry of judgment.
Tf23
With respect to the third major area of disagreement-the status of past claims and current
litigation between/among the parties or their relatives-the record is somewhat confused.
Respondent, supported by the Guardian ad Litem, contends that a critical outcome of the
agreement concerned the dismissal, with prejudice, of all past claims and pending cases in any
way related to these parties. The Guardian went so far as to state that, in her view, this was a
"deal breaker." That is, the Guardian would never have agreed to the settlement if Petitioner
could re-litigate past or present claims. From the Guardian's perspective, the continuing
litigiousness of the parties generally, and Petitioner in particular, is undermining the welfare of
the children.1* Accordingly, this aspect of the agreement was non-negotiable. For his part
15

In the Guardian's Supplemental Memorandum re: Settlement Agreement filed April 18,
2006 she states:
The primary basis for the approval by the guardian ad litem
of the settlement agreement between these parties providing for
joint physical custody of the parties' children with an equal
timesharing schedule was two fold. First and foremost, it required
an end to all litigation to date, and second, it provided an
alternative and hopefully more efficient future dispute resolution
procedure . . . . If past litigation was terminated and a process put
-10-

Petitioner argues that he only agreed to dismiss claims without prejudice. He further argues that
he cannot legally bind his relatives to an agreement limiting their right to seek redress in the
courts.
^[24
The Court's Minute Entry for November 10, 2005, entered by Commissioner Blomquist's
clerk, represents the only "official" record of the parties' appearance before the Commissioner to
document their agreement, hi support of his position Petitioner relies ^[8 of that Minute Entry,
which states that "[a] 11 claims pending regarding this case or third parties will be dismissed
without prejudice" (Emphasis added). Petitioner's Trial Ex. 003. Petitioner also relies on a copy
of the handwritten notes made by Respondent's counsel on November 10th. Plaintiffs Ex. 5
[hereinafter "counsel's notes]. Counsel's notes include two references to dismissal of claims.
One reference clearly notes "all causes of actions that have been filed all dismissed w/
prejudice." Plaintiffs Ex. 5, at 3 (second handwritten page). However, on the first handwritten
page of that exhibit there is another entry which appears to show dismissal "w/o prejudice" and
the "o" in "w/o" appears crossed-off. Petitioner pointed to that as evidence that the dismissal
was intended to be without prejudice, but did not address the second, clear reference in the notes
to dismissal with prejudice.
TJ25
After hearing all the testimony and reviewing the relevant documents the Court finds that
the parties intended the dismissal of all past claims and present causes of action to be with
prejudice.16 The Court believes and finds that % 8 of the Minute Entry is in error, much like the
immediately preceding paragraph in the Minute Entry is also in error when it references the
arbitrator as "Bill Roth," instead of David Roth. The Court especially credits the statements of
the Guardian ad Litem on this issue. The Court agrees with the Guardian that the main goal of
this settlement agreement was to protect the children from the unceasing litigation between these

in place for speedy resolution of legitimate future claims, the
parties would be free to concentrate upon parenting their children.
Clearly, while neither party is without fault in causing
hostility between them which negatively affects their children, Mr.
Bryner continues to abuse the court process and continues to be
litigious to a level which can only continue to harm his children.
His obsession with filing multiple motions, pleadings and new
actions can only take from his children his energy, focus, time and
financial resources. The litigation reached a new low with the
issuance of the second stalking injunction because it directly
harmed the children's relationship with their mother . . . . And, Mr.
Bryner continues to do all of these things despite repeated and
professional advice and instruction to the contrary.
l6

This includes the Petitioner's obligation to file releases of any and all lis pendens he's
placed on Respondent's properties upon entry of an appropriate Order following formalization of
the parties' agreement.
-11-
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parties. That goal would be rendered a nullity if Petitioner could simply re-file his claims after
dismissing them.17 As noted previously, the Court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the parties agreed that all claims arising before November 10th would be dismissed,
including claims made by either party against relatives of the other, and the dismissal of all such
claims and causes of action would be with prejudice All claims not related to the children and
arising after November 10th would be referred to binding arbitration. In sum, other than to
enforce an arbitration award, any claims arising after the November 10th date will not be brought
for action in any court.
1f26
The Court finds that a few provisions in Respondent's version of the agreement, and
challenged by Petitioner as not having been expressly negotiated, were included by necessary
implication, and/or as a logical extension of the agreed-upon terms. See, e.g.,fflfl1, 22 of
Respondent's Ex. A, Final Stipulation and Settlement Agreement.
f 27
In summary, after receiving and considering all the testimony at the February 28th hearing,
the Court found, and informed the parties, that an enforceable agreement (negotiated on
November 10th and further refined on December 8th) had been reached between the parties. The
Court also found that as between the competing versions of the settlement agreement offered by
the parties, the Respondent's version-although not perfect-more accurately depicted the
agreement between the parties. The Court hereby re-affirms those initial findings.
1f28
After making its initial findings on February 28th, the Court reviewed-paragraph by
paragraph- Respondent's Ex. A with the goal of resolving any remaining differences between the
parties. The parties agreed on the record as to the following remaining issues:
A.

Waiver of Claims and Causes of Action: With respect to ^|16, the parties agreed
to retain the first sentence of that paragraph and delete the remainder.

B.

Arbitration costs: The parties had previously agreed on November 10th that on
any issue that went to arbitration, the losing party would pay the other's total fees
and costs. At the February 28th hearing the parties further agreed that each would
pay his/her own costs if arbitration did not result in a clear winner.

C.

Tuition cost reimbursement: Within 40 days of a final settlement agreement
being signed, Petitioner would reimburse Respondent the $3,500.00 for tuition
costs already incurred by her on behalf of the children.

17

This is not a far-fetched fear; that is precisely what Petitioner did in connection with the
allegations he made on February 27, 2006 in order to secure an ex parte civil stalking injunction
order. Those allegations had been previously raised in an earlier civil stalking injunction case
which Petitioner had filed against Respondent, and then dismissed without prejudice in January
2006. There is no basis for believing that the judge who issued the ex parte Order was aware of
this fact, nor that Petitioner brought it to the judge's attention.
-12-

Tf29
hi addition to the above-stated Findings concerning the substance of the parties'
agreement, the Court believes it important to enter additional Findings concerning how the
parties have conducted themselves in this process, as those issues directly impact the decision
whether enforcing the settlement agreement reached by the parties is in the children's best
interest.
^[30
First, with respect to Petitioner, the Court finds that Petitioner's deliberate failure to
inform the Court on February 28th that the day before he had secured an ex parte civil stalking
injunction to be strong evidence of his lack of good faith in this case. This is especially true
given the extended discussion at the February 28th hearing concerning how the parties would deal
with past, current and future litigation. Further evidence of Petitioner's lack of commitment to
resolving differences between the parties in a constructive manner is found in his version of the
parties' agreement, hi it, Petitioner deletes two provisions which require the parties to cooperate.
See, e.g., Ex. 1 to Petitioner's Response and Agreement with Motion to Enforce Settlement
Agreement, f 11 (crossing-out provision requiring "each party . . . to do those things necessary to
facilitate the international travel of the other, including but perhaps not limited to signing any
necessary documents"); see also ^22 (crossing-out provision specifically requiring the parties "to
cooperate with the other through counsel or otherwise to reduce this stipulation to a final Order
and to cooperate in each and every other way necessary and proper to make sure that this
Stipulation and the Order are carried out in every detail.") Finally, as referenced at note 10 supra,
this Court is very concerned that the scenario raised by Petitioner during the discussion of the
children's passports and international travel is indicative of his inclination to exploit to its fullest
potential every possible opportunity to frustrate Respondent.
^|31
As to the Respondent, the Court hastens to add that she, too, is not blameless on this
issue. As became evident in the course of the April 11th hearing on the civil stalking injunction,
Respondent deliberately published an objectionable picture of Petitioner with the clear intent to
embarrass him. See April 20th Order. It may be that because Respondent is represented by
counsel, her actions have been more closely monitored and circumscribed. Nevertheless,
Respondent has similarly demonstrated that she is not above taking action designed to annoy
Petitioner.
^32
In further support of its concerns about these parties' ability to successfully co-parent the
children, the Court hereby incorporates by reference its April 20th Order detailing the ways in
which the parties choose to continue harassing the other. To be sure, in some limited areas
Petitioner and Respondent have managed to show some ability to work cooperatively, as in the
case of the "week-on, week-off' parenting schedule. Even then, however, the parties appear
incapable of resisting the impulse to place stumbling blocks in the path of cooperation.
Tf33
As noted previously, see supra ^[3 and accompanying note 4, the parties presented no
evidence during the Febmary 28th hearing on the question whether the custody sharing provisions
of the settlement agreement are in the best interests of the children. The Guardian ad Litem
briefly referenced her "concern[] about proceeding without the input of the custody evaluators,"
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but the issue was not discussed further. The Guardian specifically expressed concern with the
"week-on, week-off" schedule for children (who are presently ages 6 and 8). The Court has been
provided with no evidence from which it can draw reasonable conclusions as to the advisability
and sustainabiUty of such a shared-parenting schedule. Although among Petitioner's voluminous
filings in this case he has included selected portions of what appear to be a draft custody
evaluator's report. However, given that this case has not, to this point, been certified for trial, the
Court has not had the opportunity to review final copies of those reports nor to receive testimony
from the custody evaluators.
^|34
Prior to making a final determination on the advisability of enforcing the child custody
provisions of this agreement, the Court needs to receive additional evidence. Specifically, the
Court believes it necessary to take testimony from the custody evaluators and to review their
reports in full. To the extent that the information in those reports (or conclusions and
recommendations based on that information) may be outdated the custody evaluators will be
required to update them. Furthermore, after receiving all relevant and updated evidence the
Court finds it necessary to receive additional input, the Court reserves the right to appoint a third
evaluator to review the extant reports, to interview the parties and children, and to provide an
independent assessment to the Court regarding the proposed child-custody arrangements. If a
third evaluator is appointed by the Court, Petitioner and Respondent will each bear one-half of
the associated costs.
f 35
For the sake of providing the children with some stability, pending a final determination
of custody issues, it is fair and appropriate that the parties continue their present custody-sharing
arrangement.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
T|36
As part of their settlement negotiations during November 10lh and December 8th, the
parties reached an enforceable agreement as detailed herein. Except as noted below with respect
to legal and physical custody and parent-time schedules, the agreement-as construed by the
Court-resolves all remaining issues between the parties.
^[37
This Court is not bound to accept the agreement of the parties on an "all or nothing"
basis. The Court has the authority, and duty, to evaluate each of the terms of the parties'
agreement and determine whether those terms are consistent with the best interests of the
children.
^J38
It is against the public policy of this State for the Court to surrender its responsibility for
determining the children's best interest to a non-judicial officer, even if that individual is
mutually agreed upon by the parties. While the Court can agree and support the parties' efforts
to resolve minor parenting disputes with the assistance of a Special Master, final determination
of custody/parenting issues that cannot be resolved by a Special Master must lie with the Court.
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^[39
Notwithstanding the parties' agreement, the Court is unable to conclude that the custody
and parenting provisions of that agreement are in the children's best interest.
f 40
Other than the provisions related to custody, the terms of the agreement reached by the
parties are fair, appropriate, and enforceable under the law.
1J41
The agreement to arbitrate all issues ansing after November 10, 2005 that do not involve
the children is legally enforceable. Other than to enforce an arbitration award, issues satisfying
these criteria shall not be brought in any court.
f42
The Commissioner will need to certify for trial the issue of the legal and physical custody
of the children.
JUDGMENT
^[43
The parties have entered into an enforceable agreement as specified herein. Other than
the issue of the legal and physical custody of the minor children, which will be reserved for trial,
the parties have reached agreement on all remaining issues between them. Pending trial, the
parties' parent-time sharing agreement will remain m place. The custody evaluators are
requested to update and finalize their reports and provide them to the Court within forty-five (45)
days from the entry of this decision. So that these custody evaluation reports can be completed
on a timely basis, the parties to split evenly the associated cost; the Court reserves for trial the
ultimate determination of how those costs are to be allocated between the parties. The matter is
referred back to the Commissioner to complete all necessary steps to certify this matter for trial.
^[44
The Court requests that the Guardian ad Litem prepare and submit an Order consistent
with the views expressed in this opinion.
So Ordered by the Court this 8th day of May, 2006.

Denise Posse Lmd
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